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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
NORTH A:\IERICAN BUILDERS,
INC..,
A ppc ll an t ,
vs.

t

UNEl\,IPLOYl\IEXT CO~IPENSA- /Case No.
11277
TION DIVISION DEPA HT- )
l\l E N 'l' OF El\IPLOYMENT
SECCRITY, STATE OF CTAII,
Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

ST ATE:\IENT OF CASE
The Utah Department of Employment Security
of the Industrial Commission of l Ttah on January 22,
1968, acting under the provisions of Chapter 35-.J. CCA,
i'lsued a review decision holding that certain installers
of metal siding. doors, windows, and stone, etc., performed serYices in employment for wa~es within the
n1ea11ing of Sf'ction 3.3-±-:22 (j) ( 1) and ( .5) CCA.
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A decision assessed unemployment compensation contributions against the Appellant in the amount of
$2,839.70 and interest thereon to the date of the decision in the amount of $175.54. The assessment was made
on the basis of unreported subject wages in the amount
of $126,510.23. The decision was affirmed on appeal
by the Appeals Referee and by the Board of Review
of the Industrial Commission of Utah. The matter is
now before this Court on a petition for review.

STATE~1ENT

OF FACTS

Orville Grossaint, Larry Grossaint, Don Grossaint,
and Eldon ~Iecham filed claims for w1employment
compensation benefits listing on their claim the North
American Builders, Inc., as their employer during their
"base period" which was the period commencing October 1, 1966 and ending September 30, 1967. 'Vage
requests were sent to the North American Builders,
Inc., the Appellant, and these were returned to the
Department by the Appellant with the notation that
the claimants were not in employment, but were sclfemployed. The Department audited the Appellant's
records and made the aforementioned assessment on the
basis of the information obtained from its records.
The Appellant, North American Builders, Inc., an
employer subject to the payment of unemployment
compensation contributions under the provisions of
Chapter 35-..J. UCA beginning January 1, 1966, is a
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corporation engaged primarily in the business of warehousing, selling, and installing metal siding, metal doors
and windows, and other home improvements. The Appellant engages salesmen who solicit sales from home
owners. The salesmen enter into contracts with the home
owners on the Appellant's forms and in the name of
the Appellant, and the contracts provide for the furnishing and installation of materials. (TR-0014) (TR0022) ( TR-0026) .
When a contract with a home owner is received
from a salesman by the Appellant, the Appellant, if
it approves the contract, arranges for financing usually
through a bank or the FHA. Appellant then prepares
a "work order" on its own form and proceeds to contact
an installer who is a worker skilled in preparing the
building and installing the steel or aluminum siding,
windows, doors, etc. This contract with the installer
is made either by telephone or at the time the installer
comes to the Appellant's office to ask for a "work order."
( TR-0014<) ( TR-00399).
The installers (in almost all cases there are two
nr more on each job) furnish a truck, hammers, saws,
ladders, planks, scaffolds, cutters, etc. ( TR-0041). The
Appellant fixes the piece-rate amount which the installer is to be paid for the several types of materials
to he installed. At the time covered by the assessment,
the schedule of fees was as follows: Steel siding, $17.00
rer square of 100 square feet for work done in Salt Lake
and ~:2:2.00 per square for work done outside of the
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Salt Lake area. (The piece rate for aluminum siuing
was $2.00 less per square.) The piece rate for stripping
was established by the Appellant at $5.00 per square
and the piece rate for installing doors and windows was
fixed by Appellant, subject in a few unusual cases to
some negotiation with the installer. (TR-0038) (TR0039) . The installer might turn down a "work order"
if he felt that it involved a job which was too small
and too far away or if he was currently working in
making installations for some other company.
There are only about 15 crews of installers available
to the industry in Utah and their names and abilities
are known throughout the industry. As the president
of the Appellant company testified ( TR-0018), "This
is a trade all its own. I would say that it is a skill. You
can't get anybody-you can't get a carpenter to do the
same work. You are limited, in other words, to workers
in this area" (meaning the area of siding and metal
install a ti on) .
'Vhen aluminum siding first came intc the area,
a manufacturer sent an instructor into the area to teach
its installation, but generally the installers haYe learned
the trade from other installers. ( TR-0054).
'Vhen the installers receiYe a "work order" at the
office of the Appellant, they driYe their truck to the
Appellant's warehouse. There, assisted by an employee
of the Appellant, they load their trucks with the material
specified by the Appellant. ( TR-004 I). (In most cases
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this loading process takes about one-half hour.) If
stripping is required on the job, (the . c\..ppellant does
not 'rnrehouse stripping) the installers drive to a lumber yard, obtain the necessary stripping, and unless it
is a small amount, the installers have it charged to the
Appellant. ( TR-0041 j. If the amount of the stripping
or other needed material is small, the installer will pay
for the material and be reimbunied by the Appellant
upon presentation of a bill. If the "work order" specifies the installation of stone which is not warehoused
by the Appellant, the installers obtain the stone from
the premises of a supplier and charge it to the Appellant. ( TR-0042) . If doors or windows are not standard
the installer, when arriving at the job and taking the
measurements, phones them in to the Appellant, who
has them made. The installer will then pick up the doors
or windows, as the case might be, and transports them
to the job. ( TR-0057). The installers are supervised
at the warehouse in the loading of the materials but
on the job the work is done without any immediate
supervision by the Appellant, although their work may
he inspected by the salesman who sold the job. In cases
where the installers obtain additional material because
the original material given them was insufficient to
cover the area involved, the salesman might remeasure
the job to determine the total number of squares which
were actually needed.
If the installer travels to a job and the job has
been cancelled for any reason he is, at times, compen~atecl for his lost time and expense on a basis which
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is determined by the Appellant. ( TR-0057). In case
there are unw>ed materials, the installers haul them in
their truck back to the Appellant's warehouse where
the installers unload them. ( TR-0057). 'Vhen a job
is completed, the installers are paid when they return
to the Appellant's office and present the "completed"
"work order." ( TR-0023). At times the payment is
made to one of the installers who, in turn, divides the
payment with the other installers who worked with him.
At times payments were made directly to the several
installers by the Appellant.
During the period of the assessment the Appellant
did not deduct Social Security or withholding taxes but
the Appellant did maintain 'V orkmen' s Compensation
coverage on the installers. ( TR-0025).
None of the installers whose wages were involved
in the assessment had business cards, business telephones, or offices. They did not advertise (any business
of the same nature as they were invo!Yed herein). (TR0035). They obtained work by regularly contacting
employers or by having employers call them at their
homes. ( TR-0027) ( TR-0039) . The installers generally
were engaged in performing services on the piece-rate
basis for the several employers in the industry. During
the assessment period, the Grossaints spent most of their
time working for the Appellant. They testified thHt
they did, as a matter of practice during the period
in question, go to the Appellant's office each day when
they were not working on a job, to wait for jobs to
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come in. ( Tll-0055) ( TH-0056). Prior to the assessment period the Grossaints had dissolved partnerslup
whieh was formed for the purpose of obtaining a coutractor' s license and were working as individuals on
the piece-rate basis. Orville Grossaint testified as follows
in explaining why he and his sons obtained the coutraetor' s license in the first instauee. ( TR-0048).
"Let me explain it I thid( iL is important. In
about April, 1965, we were approached by different companies that we were going to be required
to get a contractor's license in order to put this
siding on, and we were interested in it so we
went up and talked to l\Ir. Hendrickson at the
contractor's board, and he explained just why
he thought it was essential to get a contractor's
license. So 1 think out of about 25 or 30 applicators in Salt Lake City, there was one contractor's license issued, and I think maybe two.
And we went to, I think it was the First \Vestern Construction with .Jack Lord, and we asked
him-we found out what it would cost us, you
know, to pick up a contractor's license and how
we was going to get paid for having a contractor's license.
"And at the time we figured it would cost us

15 percent above the price of applicating at the

time to take care of our book work and pay our
tax, and what have you. And so we went to
Layne Kimball and he said. 'Yes, if you will
take care of your own book work, and pay your
O"Wn tax, I will be willing to pay you 15 percent
extra.'
"And the same thing was said when we went
to wnrk for :\Ir. Pavich. But there was only two
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people that ever paid us that 1.5 percent, and
that was Jack Lord and Layne Kimball of First
lVestern Construction. But we carried ,on for
about six months when I found out-after we
split up our partnership-the boys got the same
wages per square that I did, the same dollars
per square, the same amount of money I did
and I think I did two or three jobs and got paid
under the name of D.O.L. Construction Company, and I walked in the office one day and I
got a check made to Orville Grossaint instead
of D.0.L. Construction Company. Now I don't
know why this was stopped, but it wasn't at my
request. So I came up here aud withdrew my
11umber up here and went everywhere else and
took care of it. I went to an attorney. There were
some papers drawn up at the tim~ and I think
they have a copy of it."
Donald Grossaint testified
(TR-0053) .
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the same subject.

.Mr. Dremann: "Do you have a license at the
present time, Donald? ·
D. Grossaint: "No.
Mr. Dremann: "Did you ever make application for a license~
D. Grossaint: "No.
~lr. Dremanu: "Do rou recall the incident
when the D.0.L. Construction Company was
formed and the license was taken out?

D. Gross:i.int: "Thev told us up at the Statr
Contractor's Board tl;at all applicators in the
future would be required to have a license to
install siding. They told us that anvone who
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wasn't was going to be liable to a fine and imprisonme11t for not having a contractor's liee!ls.~.

l\Ir. Dremann: "So on that basis you
or<>'a
n;zed
•
b
a partnership and took out your eontractor-s license.
Referee: "\Vho was it told you that (
D. Grossaint: "l\lr. Ilendriekson in the State
Contractor's Office.

l\Ir. Dremann: ''Now since the D.O.L. Construetion ceased to operate under the lieense that
was taken out at the time, you have not had a
license~
·
D. Grossai11t: ".No, but I have received some
papers that if I didn't have one, or get in contact
with them in 10 days, I was liable for a fine
and imprisonment, and me and my brother went
up there and talked to l\Ir. Hendrickson and
he told us we were not contractors and did not
need a contractor's license .. ,
The Appellant at all times was aware of the fact
that the installer, with the truck and the majority of
the tools, had other installers working with him and
the Appellant at times paid these other installers directly. ('l'R-00:28) ( TH-0029). The Appellant knew
the names of all of the installers whose wages are in
<1uestion and it is from the Appellant that the auditor obtained his wage breakdown. ( TR-0017). The president
of Appellant, :\Ir. Pavich, testified for the Appellant.
(TR-0017):
"They are engaged, in other words, steel
applicat ;'.>ll. I would say 80 percent is steel
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application and the other 20 percent mav be
window changing. They are all engaged the s'ame,
other than '~rayne Case, I think he is a roofer."
(The record show~ that \V ayne Case advertised himself as a roof er under the name of New Style Roofing
Methods.) One other installer, Lavoy Hardy, Orangeville, Utah, appears to have a business of a different
nature than that involved in his service for Appellant.
Mrs. Erickson testified for the Appellant. ( TR-0030) :
"Well, Mr. Hardy has applied siding for us.
He lives in Orangeville, Utah, but he generally
does his own selling, his own contracting in that
area down there. He will sell remodel jobs or
siding jobs and purchase the material and put
it on himself, but when we get busy we will call
him and ask him to come to work for us." (Italics
ours.)
In every instance the installer in this case was paid on
a piece-rate basis. There was no sale of material to any
installer by the Appellant. ( TR-0031).

STATE~1ENT

OF POINTS

THE INSTALLERS \VERE PERFORMING PERSONAL SERYICES :FOR THE APPELLANT NORTH AMERICAN BUILDERS,
'
INC., FOR \V AGES \VITHIN THE MEANING
OF THE UTAII EMPLOYlVIENT SECURITY
ACT, CHAPTER 35--:i UCA.
1.
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2. THE SERVICES OF THE INSTALLERS

"TERE NOT EXCLUDED FROM THE ACT
BY REASON OF THE EXCLUSION PROVISIONS OF SECTION 35-4-22 (j) (5) (A) (B)
AND (C) UCA.
3. THE INDIVIDUALS REFERRED

TO
IN APPELLANT'S BRIEF AS POINT T\VO
\VERE PERFORl\IING SERVICES IN EMPLOYJVIENT \VITIIIN THE "MEANING OF
SECTION 35-4-22 (h) (2) UCA.
4. THE ISSUE OF DESIGNATING A PART

OF THE PA Yl\ilENT TO THE INSTALLERS
AS EXPENSES \VAS NEVER RAISED BY
APPELLANT AT ANY APPEAL STAGE OF
THIS MATTER AND SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED BY THE COURT.

ARGUlWENT
POINT I
THE INSTALLERS 'VERE PERFORl\ilING
PERSONAL SERVICE,S FOR THE APPEL~
LANT FOR 'VAGES 'VITHIN THE l\IEANING OF THE UTAH El\1PLOY1\1ENT SECURITY ACT CHAPTER 35-4.
The provisions of the Utah Employment Security
Act Chapter 35-4< UCA for determinng whether or not
individuals are performing services "in employment"
11

have been interpreted by this Court in a number of
unemployment compensation cases. (See Globe Grain
& Milling Company vs. Industrial Commission and
Albert Thomas, 98 U. 36, 91 P. 2d 512; Creameries
of America vs. Industrial Commission and Robert L.
Foss, 98 U. 577, 102 P. 2d 300; Salt Lake Tribune Publishing Company vs. Industrial Commission and Lynn
Clark Cushing, 99 U. 259, 102 P. 2d 307; The Fuller
Brush Company vs. Industrial Commission and Lamont Holst, 99 U. 97, 104 P. 2d 201; Singer Sewing
Machine Company vs. Industrial Commission and
Gorman C. Winget, 104 U. 175, 134 P. 2d 479; B.
Grant Powell, also known as B. G. Powell, dba, Royal
Blaze Coal Company vs. Industrial Commission, 210
P. 2d 1006; H. L. and Irene Leach, dba, Rusco "lVindow Company vs. Board of Review of Industrial Commission, Department of Employment Security, 123
U. 423, 260 P. 2d 744.)
Section 35-4-22 UCA provides as follows:
" ( h) ( 2) Each individual employed to perform or to assist in performing the work of any
person in the service of an employing unit shall
be deemed to be engaged by such employing unit
for all the purposes of this act whether such individual was hired or paid directly by such employing unit or by such person, provided the employing unit had actual or constructive knowledge
of the work."

"(j) ( 1) 'Employment' means any service performed prior to January l, 1941, which was employment as defined in the Utah unemployment
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compecisa tion law prior to the effective date of
this act, and subject to the other provisions of
this subsection, service performed after Decern_ber :-n, 194<0, including senice in interstate commerce, and service as an officer of a corporation
performed for wages or under any contract of
hire written or oral, express or implied."
" ( p) 'Wages' means all remuneration for personal service, including commissions and bonuses
and the cash value of all remuneration in any
medium other than cash. Gratuities custornarily
received by an individual in the course of his
employment from persons other than his employing unit shall be treated w; wages received froni
his employing unit. The reasonable cash value
of remuneration in any medium other than cash
and the reasonable amount of gratuities shall be
estimated and determined in accordance with
rules prescribed by the Commission; provided,
that the term 'wages' shall not include:
" ( 1) For the purpose of Section 35-4-7, that
part of the remuneration which after remuneration equal to $3,,000 has been paid to an individual by an employer with respect to employment subject to this act during any calendar year
prior to calendar y~.f'lr 1964 and that part of
the remuneration which, after remuneration equal
to $4,200 has been paid to an individual by an
employer with respect to employment during
calendar year 1964 and any calendar year thereafter, is paid to such individual by such employer
during such calendar year; provided, however,
that for the purposes of this subsection remuneration over $4 ,200 shall be deemed to be wages
subject to contribution to the same extent that
such remuneration is defined as wages by the
Federal C nemployment Tax Act as amended."
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Accordingly, if it is found that the services of individuals
in question are performed for an employing unit for
wages, then the services are within the purview of the
Employment Security Act, unless they are excluded
by the conjunctive statutory tests of Section 35-4-22
(j) (5) (A) (B) and (C) which are as follows:
" ( 5) Services performed by an_ individual for
wages or under any contract of hire, written or
oral, express or implied, shall be deemed to be
employment subject to this act unless and until
it is shown to the satisfaction of the commission
that-

" (A) such individual has been and will continue to be free from control or direction over
the performance of such services, both under his
contract of hire and in fact; and
" ( B) such service is either outside the usual
course of the business for which such service
is performed or that such service is performed
outside of all the places of business of the enterprise for which such service is performed; and
"(C) such individual is customarily engaged
in an independently established trade, occupation, profession, or business of the same nature
as that involved in the contract of service."
In the Leach case supra, this Court had under consideration the question of whether certain dealers and
window instaUers performing work under circumstances basically similar to those of the salesmen and
installers in the instant case, were performing services
"in employment." In the instant case we are concerned
only with the status of the installers. The facts in the
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Leach case differ only in that the installers were given
training by the company. The work was done pursuant
to the provisions of written contracts and the installers
usually had full or part time work of a different nature
than that involved in their contract of service. This
other work was for other employers. In discussing
whether the installers were performing services for
"wages", the Court said in the Leach case supra:
"There can be no question but what the installers were performing services for the plaintiffs
for 'wages.' After l.he plaintiffs accepted an order
they were obligated by contract to furnish and
install the products. The installers performed a
service for the plaintiffs which was in fulfillment
of the plaintiffs' contract with the customer.
'Vhen the plaintiffs needed someone to install
windows, they notified one of the installers who
called at the plaintiffs' place of business and
obtained the windows and any other necessary
materials along with a list of specifications. After
completing the job, he returned a completed
form to the plaintiffs verifying that the windows
had been installed and received compensation
governed by a schedule formulated by the plaintiffs."
In the instant case, each of the installers who
worked at installing whenever he could find work,
performed a service for the Appellant which was in
fulfillment of the Appellant's contract with its customer.
\Vhen Appellant needed someone to install siding or
windows or doors, etc., it notified an installer by telephone or so notified the installer at Appellant's office.
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The installer picked up the "work order" at Appellant's
office and went in his own truck to Appellant's warehouse where, assisted by Appellant, he loaded the necessary materials. This usually took about one-half hour.)
He then trucked the materials to the job location and
made the installation according to the "work order."
After the job was completed he returned the completed
"work order" to the Appellant certifying that the work
had been done and he was then paid compensation on
a piece-rate basis which was formulated by the Appellant.
In the Leach case supra, the Supreme Court said:
"The service performed by the dealers and
installers for the plaintiffs is analogous to the
service found to be rendered for the newspaper
publishing company by its newspaper carriers
in the case of Salt Lake Tribune Publishing
Company vs. Industrial Commission, 99 Utah
259, 102 P. 2d 307. There the company was
interested in seeing that its newspaper reached
its subscribers and in order to accomplish that
result it entered into a contract wherebv a carrier
was to perform the service of delivering its newspapers. Similarly, in Creameries of America,
Inc. vs. Industrial Commission, supra, we held
that one Foss, who was a 'franchise dealer' of
the plaintiff's products was rendering personal
services for wages for the plaintiff in distributing
its products to its customers.
"Having determined then that both the dealers
and installers performed services for 'wages' for
the plaintiffs, we must next ascertain whether the
dealers and the installers are excluded from the
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operation of the Act by the test posed in Section
35-J-22 (j) (5) (A) (B) and (C)." (The Court
quoted that section.)
"It will be noted that the three requirements
of the test are stated conjunctively and hence all
three requirements must be met if the services
rendered for the plaintiffs are to be excluded
from the Act."

POINT II
THE SERVICES OF THE "INSTALLERS"
ARE NOT EXCLUDED UNDER THE (A) (B)
AND (C) PROVISIONS OF SECTION 35-4-22
(j) (5).
A. SUCH INDIVIDUALS \VERE NOT
FREE .FRO~I DIRECTION OR CONTROL
OVER THE PERFORMANCE OF SUCH
SERVICES.
In the case of Salt Lake Tribune Publishing Company vs. Industrial Commission, supra, this Court in
discussing the element of control said:
"While there is also some evidence in the
record to the effect that the company had no
right to, and did not in fact exercise any 'control
or direction over the performance' of the services
performed by Cushing, still the evidence set out
above is ample to support the finding of the
Commission that 'the claimant in this case was
not free from direction and control over the performance of services rendered under his contract.' Al all events the evidence is such that we
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cannot say that the Commission must, as reasonable men, have found that claimant was free from
such control.'~
The Appellant employed installers who were skilled
in their trade and kne"v much more about the details
of their work than did the management employees of
the Appellant. The Appellant had no supervisory employees at the installations. There was an almost complete reliance on the installt:fr to perform to the specifications of the "work order" to the satisfaction of
the home owner. The installers were well aware that
to maintain a continuing relationship with the Appellant
their work must be well done. Otherwise they would
be given no further "work orders." The Appellant, by
withholding "work orders" could easily and effectively
terminate the relationship with the installer.
An employer hiring a skilled craftsman from a
union hall would have little or no reason to supervise
his actual performance but he would have every right
to direct him. While the Appellant did not supervise
the actual installation, the president of Appellant did
have immediate supervision over the loading and unloading of materials at the Appellant's warehouse.
The "work orders" themselves were a form of
direction and control and the Appellant had every right
to see that the performance was done according to its
orders. The installers were not required to be on a
job at a particular hour but they were working for
a living and being paid their wages on a piece-rate basis
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so they di<l the work promptly. If they had failed to perform according to the "work order" and to perform
promptly, the Appellant had every right to termina~e
the relationship by taking the "work order" away from
them.
This has become a nation of highly-skilled specialists. An employer or supervisor can offer little advice
or instruction to a fully trained person at the actual
performance of his work. The role of the employer in
such cases is generally, in relation to the skilled worker,
to make the work assignment, check the quality of the
result, and control the relations and actions of such
worker and his fellow workers. There can be little
doubt that the Appellant had the right to remove an
installer from the job at the home of the customer if
the customer demanded it on the grounds that the
installer was intoxicated or otherwise objectionable.
It must be kept in mind that under the instant
situation, particular individuals were engaged by the
Appellant because they had the required skills and they
were engaged to perform their services personally.
In the case of Creameries of America, Inc. vs.
Industrial Commission, supra, the Court discussed the
meaning of personal services as follows:
"Section 19 ( p) defines 'wages' as 'all remuneration payable for personal services, including
commissions and bonuses and the case value of
all remuneration payable in any medium other
than c<ish.' The terms 'services' and 'personal
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service' used in defining 'wages' are not specifically defined in the Act. In ordinary usage the
term 'services' has a rather broad and general
meaning. l t includes generally any act performed
for the benefit of another under some arrangement or agreement whereby such act was to have
been performed. The general definition of 'service' as given in 'Vebster's New International
Dictionary is 'performance of labor for the benefit of another'; 'L'lct or instance of helping, or
benefiting.' The term 'personal service' indicates
that the 'act' done for the benefit of another is
done personally by a particular individual.
"Where under \V orkmen' s Compensation Acts
the term 'service' was used in defining an employee the courts have held that the word implies
a submission to the will of another as to direction
and control, ( Missisippi Theatre Corp. v. Halliesburg Local Union, 174 lYiiss. 439, 164 So.
887) ; or indicates a master-servant relationship
(Rutherford vs. Tobin, 336 Mo. 1171, 82 S.,V.
(2d) 918). But in all cases the intention of the
legislature as to the meaning of the term in the
particular act governs (Rutherford v. Tobin,
supra). And in some acts both 'employee' and
'independent contractor' are defined in terms of
service. Under the California Act an independent
contractor is defined as one 'who renders service,
other than manual labor, for a specified recompense for a specified result, under the control
of his principal as to the result of his work only
and not as to the means bv which such result is
accomplished.' (Italics added.) See Fidelity &
Casualtv Co. YS. Industrial Accident Comm.,
191 Cal. 404, 216 P. 578."
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The Commission and referee properly found that
the installers were not excluded from coverage of the
Act under the "A test."

B. THE SERVICE \VAS PERFORMED IN
THE USUAL COURSE OF THE EMPLOYER'S BUSINESS AND PART OF THE SERVICE WAS PERFORMED IN THE EMPLOYER'S PLACE OF BUSINESS.
The contract with the home owner, which is negotiated by the Appellant through its agent, the salesman,
provides that for a certain sum of money the Appellant
will provide the necessary materials, deliver them to
the home and install them in a satisfactory manner.
This was the employer's usual course of business.
The Appellant's work order and its arrangement
with the installer required the installer, as a part of his
performance, to bring his own truck to the Appellant's
warehouse where, under direction of the Appellant,
he performed the task of loading the necessary materials
for the job. This loading work, usually taking about
one-half hour per home installation, was performed at
the place of business of the Appellant, and was an
integral part of the work to be performed. In no sense
could it be classified as negligible or as incident to
anything other than the employer's usual course of
operation. In addition, the installer was required to
return any unused materials to the warehouse and perform the job of unloading those materials. All of the
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work was done in the usual course of the Appellant's
business. This was not a case where a customer might
come to the place of business and purchase materials
such as is described by counsel in his brief. In the
instant case, there is no such buyer-seller relationship.
Were this a situation where the employer, in the usual
course of his business, delivered the materials to the job
site by means other than using the installer's truck and
the installer only occasionally picked up a needed or
forgotten article, the situation might be viewed in a
different light. But this case is not of that nature. The
Appellant did not deliver materials other than through
his employee, the installer, and the work of loading
them was significant and as much a part of his overall
job as the actual installation. The piece-rate payments
which were made to him included compensation for his
time spent in loading and hauling the materials to the
site of the work and he was expected to do this loading
and hauling personally. This was the nature of his
contract of hire.
C. IT 'VAS NOT SHO,VN TO THE SATISFACTION OF THE COl\!IMISSION THAT
THE INSTALLERS 'VERE CUSTOMARILY
ENGAGED IN INDIVIDUALLY ESTABLISHED TRADES, OCCUPATIONS, PROFESSIONS OR BUSINESSES OF THE SAME
NATURE AS TIIAT INVOLVED IN THE
CONTRACT OF SERVICE.
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In the case of Leach vs. Board of Review, supra,
the Court discussed those elements to be considered in
determining whether or not the dealers and installers
were "customarily engaged in an independently established trade, etc.,'' the Court said:
"Assuming for the purposes of this decision
that the evidence compels a finding that the dealers and installers met the requirements of both
(A) and ( B ) , there is evidence in the record
from which the Board of Review could have
reasonably concluded that requirement ( C) was
not met, i.e. that neither the dealers nor the instailers wtre 'customarily engaged in an independently established trade, occupation, profession or business of the same nature as that involved in the contract of service.' In Fuller
Brush Co. v. Ind. Comm., supra, we pointed out
that a shoe shiner, an auto mechanic, a plumber
and a barber meet this requirement because the
services which they perform emanate as a part
of a business in which they are engaged. They
perform services for others while in the pursuit
of a business independently established and in
which they are customarily engaged and for
which service, like a common carrier, they hold
themselves out to perform. The plaintiffs urge
that each dealer was customarily engaged in the
independently established business of salesmanship. This contention is untenable. Requirement
( C) contemplates that the service rendered is a
part of, and is rendered in pursuance of, a business of the person rendering the service, independently established, in which that person is
customarily engaged. In other words, the 'independently established business' must exist independent of the services under consideration in
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the sense that it is the whole-of which the par.
ticular service is a part. In Fuller Brush Co. \'.
Ind. Comm., supra, it was stated:
'Plaintiff contends that the provision [re·
quiremeut C} refers wholly to the service in·
valved, and argues that if m rendering sud
service, claimant was acting for himself ht
was engaged in a business of his own, ana
therefore during such employment was customarily engaged in an independently established business. The difficulty with this posi·
tion is that it ignores entirely the significance
of the words "customarily" and "independently." The statute does not say, as the Colorado
court read it in Industrial Comm. v. Northwestern .Mutual Life Ins. Co., 103 Colo. 550,
88 P. 2d 560, "independently engaged in an
established business." The adverb "independently" clearly modifies the word "establishes,"
and must therefore carry the meaning that the
"busines!; ' or "trade" was established independently of the employer or the rendering
of the personal service forming the basis of
the claim. And in the exclusion clauses (ii
( 5) , or perhaps more correctly the clauses
making the exception from the general inclusion of all persons rendering personal services
for wages, the present tense "is" indicates the
employee must be engaged in such independent
business at the time of rendering the service
involved. "Customarily" means usually, habitually, according to the customs, general prac·
tice or usual order of things, regularly.'
"Uv their agreements with the plaintiffs, deal·
ers w~re not allowed to sell products not ~arried
b)' the plaintiffs, although there was testimony
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that some dealers did not in fact abide by this
restriction. However, it is not enough that the
dealers may have other sources of income. ln
selling such other products the dealers were not
pursuing an independently established business,
but rather working under contract of employment with other parties. The dealers paid nothing
for their franchises or dealerships. They were
prohibited by their agreements with the plaintiffs from assigning their franchises to anyone
else. The risk of profit and loss was all in the
plaintiffs. Selling for the plaintiffs was the only
or at least the main business of the dealers, if
indeed it can be called a business. They had
nothing aside from their relationship with the
plaintiffs. 'Vhen the services of a dealer were
terminated by the plaintiffs, he became unemployed and had to secure employment elsewhere.
He had no business of his own to fall back on
- a business established independently of his
relationship with the plaintiffs and from which
his services for the plaintiffs emanate, a business
in which he was customarily engaged aside from
his relationship with the plaintiffs. The dealers'
occupation was selling, but they had no independently established business as do brokers or
commission merchants. None of the dealers held
themselves out to the public as operating a sales
agency. "
The Court then quoted from its holdings in the
Globe Grain and Milling Company vs. Industrial Commission supra and Creameries of America vs. Indus'
'
trial Commission, supra. The Court then continued:
"'Vhat we have said in regard to the dealers
applies equally as well to the installers. Their
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situation differs from the dealers only in tha\
a small fraction of their time was consumed in
rendering service for the plaintiffs whereas the
dealers spent almost all, if not all, their working
time performing services for the plaintiffs. How
ever, this difference does not strengthen their
case insofar as meeting requirement ( C). The
evidence reveals that two of the installers were
regularly employed by the Kennecott Copper
Company, one by the United States Smelting
& Refining Company, one was a salesman, ano
another's occupation was unknown. It is readil)
apparent that because the installers were so em
ployed, their services which they rendered for the
plaintiffs did not emanate from any independ·
ently established business in which they were
customarily engaged. To the contrary, they were
customarily engaged in employment elsewhere
for other employers. None of them were licensed
contractors or self-employed carpenters or crafts·
men. "
In the instant case the installers, when not em
ployed by Appellant, had to find employment with other
employers in the installation industry. They differ from
those in the Leach case in that their other employment
was of the same nature as that involved in their work for
Appellant. In the Leach case most of the installen
had jobs of a different nature than installing.
The skilled carpenter who is a member of the union
is in a similar position. 'Vhen he finishes a job for au
employer, he must find other carpenter work. Instead
of contacting a prospective employer directly, he reg·
isters at the union hall and when an employer order
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comes iu and he is next on the hiring list, he is referred
lli to the job. If the carpenter has a job with an employer
1t
which covers a long period of time he doesn't have to
1g
v. register at the hiring hall.

1at

If

The claimants Grossaint spent the majority of their
re time working for Appellant and on most days when not
~r out on a job they were at Appellant's office waiting
ig for "work orders." 0. Grossaint testified that during
1d
I) 1967 he worked for Appellant steadily except for one
1. job which he did for Utah-Idaho Roofing and Siding
1t Company. His two sons worked with him most of the
j. time. ( TR-0040) .

11

The Appellant offered only scanty testimony about
the other installers which were included in the assessment. \Ve do not know whether or not such other installers worked more or less full time with other employers.

1

From the testimony it is reasonable to conclude
that the installers were engaged throughout the industry on a "piece-rate" basis and that in no case was a
profit and loss situation present. None of the installers
has business cards, business telephones, places of business, or classified advertising which would hold them
out to the public as installers. A few, including Grossaint, have licenses. The Grossaints testified (TR-0048)
(TR-00.53) that they were informed by the "State Contractors Board" that they were not contractors and did
not need contractor's licenses.
They were customarily engaged when not working
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for the Appellant by other employers for piece-rat
wages which were fixed by the employer in the industr)
They were required to furnish their own tools and tr
perform the services which the Appellant, in its contraC'
with the home owner, had contracted to perform. Thi
installers performed in the course of business of th1
Appellant-they had no agreement whatever with th1
home owner. They operated on "work orders" givet
them by Appellant and if their work was not satis·
factory the Appellant had the right to tell them hr
make changes and the employer could ref use in tht
future to give them any "work orders." It appears frorn
the testimony that there are only a few concerns lefl
in the metal siding business.
Eldon R. Mecham testified that he performed in
the same manner as the Grossaints. (TR-0058). He
was a member of the carpenters' union but he did car·
penter work only for the Appellant. When he worked
with someone else the two of them split the money "right
down the middle." ( TR-0059). The other installers by
trade were carpenters, roofers, stone masons, plasterers,
etc. For example, Mrs. Erickson stated, in testifying
for Appellant, about Andy Lee, an installer:
"He came to work for us. He came to work
primarily to put-ston~ o.n. lie is .a stol1;~ mas,on.
I think, as well as a s1dmg applicator.
('IR
0029).
She testified about Gary Cockran:
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"Oh, he did a clean-up job I think once and
I dealt with him directly but otherwise he-a11d
only through Brent Cropper." ( TR-0030).
She testified:
"Lee Brown does plastering work and that
type of thing - he has often worked for l\ir.
Smith, ·who is our Kenetex applicator." (TR-

0031).

The testimony of the Appellant's witnesses contains little to show that the several tradesmen working
for Appellant were customarily engaged in independently established trades, occupations, professions, or
businesses. The Commission and the Referee properly
found that they were not so established.
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POINT III
THE INDIVIDUALS REFERRED TO IN
APPELLANT'S BRIEF AS POINT II 'VERE
PERFORMING SERVICES IN EMPLOYMENT 'VITHIN THE MEANING OF SECTION 35-4-22 (h) (2) UCA:
" ( 2) Each individual employed to perform or
to assist in performing the work of any person
in the service of an employing unit shall be
deemed to be engaged by such employing unit
for all the purposes of this act whether such
individual was hired or paid directly by such
employing unit or by such person, provided the
employing unit had actual or constructive knowledge ~f the work."
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The individuals named in Appellant's Point II
were engaged with the full and complete knowledge 01
Appellant to assist in the performance of the installa.
tion work. This becomes perfectly obvious since the
information used in making the detailed audit contain.
ing the names of all individuals performing service~
was obtained from the Appellant's records. All of the
installers, the principals and the helpers, came and wen!
from the Appellant's office and from the Appellant'~
warehouse. Referring to several of the individuals listed
in Point II we find that; C. Gonsowsky was actually
hired by a salesman who was an agent of the Appellant
and Gonsowsky, therefore, was in fact hired by Appel·
lant; Thomas Jones worked with his son, Robert, and
constituted another father and son team. The Appel·
lant of course was aware of the fact that installing siding
was generally not just a one-man job.
Grossaint testified ( TR-0044) :
" ... Lynn Bell . . . worked with us, not for
us. "
In practice, payments at times were made to the
lead installer and were then split down the middle witl1
the other installer or installers and at times paymenti
were made to each of the installers.
'Vithin the Section 22 (j) ( 5) (A) ( B), and (Cl.
supra, and the above quoted Section 22 (h) (2), all
of the individuals engaged to work with installers were
performing services for Appellant for wages.
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POINT IV

OJ

THE ISSUE OF DESIGNATING A PART
OF THE PAYl\iIENT TO INSTALLERS AS
EXPENSES WAS NEVER RAISED BY APPELLANT AT ANY APPEAL STAGE AND
SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED BY THE
COURT.
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At no time prior to the filing of Appellant's brief
was the issue of designating a portion of the payments
to the installers as expenses even referred to by Appellant. In fact, the amount of the assessment was never
really in question. We are unable to determine whether
the Appellant did or did not keep records of the expenses of its installers. If a record was kept, it seems
quite clear that the Department auditor would have
taken such expenses into consideration. Neither of the
Appellant' st witnesses offered any testimony in the
hearing before the Appeals Referee to the effect that
expenses should be deducted nor did they take any
action before the Commission representative which
resulted in a review decision which was being appealed
to the Referee. In its appeal to the Board of Review,
the Appellant said nothing of any claim that the assessment was too high. An examination of the record before
the Appeals Referee ( TR-0060) shows the following
exchange:
"Referee: If von have nothing further-you
will get the info~mation relative to the accuracy
of figures inYolved in the audit, )fr. N emelka?

31

"Mr. N emelka: Yes I will, the first .Monda: co1
or Tuesday."
, ba:
The question of the Referee and the answer of counst
were occasioned by an"off the record" discussion as tr
whether the wages in the assessment were accurate!!
listed. The record does not reveal that information wa
filed by Appellant indicating that the assessment wa
incorrect and the issue is raised for the first time b:
Appellant in its brief.
The Appellant was charged with the duty of keep
ing records in such a manner that would show that'
certain part of the payments were for expenses and othe1
parts were for wages. If there was a record kept o:
expenses, the auditor made the proper allowance. Ht
made the proper allowance, that is, if the employer'·
records contained documentation of any expenses listei
therein.
Appellant's contention in Point II should be di1
missed as being without merit.

CONCLUSIONS
We submit that the installers are within the purview of the Utah Employment Security Act as inter
preted by previous decisions of this Court and, there
fore, were performing services in employment withi1
the meaning of the Act. "\Ve further submit, therefon
that those installers who filed claims for unemploymen'
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nda: compensation benefits are entitled to benefits on the
basis of the ''wages" paid to those installers by the
LlllSt Appellant. The Re.spondents, therefore, pray that findas tr ings of the said Respondents that the installers were
atel1 performing services in employment as defined by the
wa Act be affirmed.
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